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Abstract With rise in security breaches over the past few years, there has
been an increasing need to mine insights from social media platforms to raise
alerts of possible attacks in an attempt to defend conflict during competition.
In this study, we attempt to build a framework that utilizes unconventional
signals from the darkweb forums by leveraging the reply network structure of
user interactions with the goal of predicting enterprise related external cyber
attacks. We use both unsupervised and supervised learning models that ad-
dress the challenges that come with the lack of enterprise attack metadata for
ground truth validation as well as insufficient data for training the models. We
validate our models on a binary classification problem that attempts to pre-
dict cyber attacks on a daily basis for an organization. Using several controlled
studies on features leveraging the network structure, we measure the extent
to which the indicators from the darkweb forums can be successfully used to
predict attacks. We use information from 53 forums in the darkweb over a span
of 17 months for the task. Our framework to predict real world organization
cyber attacks of 3 different security events, suggest that focusing on the reply
path structure between groups of users based on random walk transitions and
community structures has an advantage in terms of better performance solely
relying on forum or user posting statistics prior to attacks.
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1 Introduction
With recent data breaches such as those of Yahoo, Uber, Equifax 1 among sev-
eral others that emphasize the increasing financial and social impact of cyber
attacks, there has been an enormous requirement for technologies that could
provide such organizations with prior alerts on such data breach possibilities.
Such security threat intelligence information would help address the following:
(1) while organizations spend a lot of money to secure network systems that
could avoid such data breaches [1], it is not devoid of exposures to vulnera-
bilities specially as such platforms depend on a large number of third party
software systems. (2) an alert for a possible intrusion into technology platforms
like email servers or malware injection into softwares could actually help orga-
nizations focus on a specific set of components in a short time, thereby allowing
faster security tightening to avoid being exploited on a regular basis [2].
The total number of data breaches in 2017 crossed 10002 across all sec-
tors which is a record high, considering previous years and exposing over a
billion records containing sensitive data. On the vulnerability front, the Risk
Based Security’s VulnDB database 3 published a total of 4837 vulnerabilities
in a quarter of 2017 which was around 30% higher than previous year. This
motivates the need for an extensive application that can track vulnerability
based information from external sources to raise alerts on such data breaches.
While the darkweb is one such place on the internet where users can share
information on software vulnerabilities and ways to exploit them [3,4] and
where it might be difficult to track the actual identity of those users, what
they leave behind are the footprints of their posting and interaction patterns
in forums. In this paper, as one of contributions in the field of cyber attack
prediction, we leverage the information obtained from evolving reply networks
of discussions in the darkweb forums while also capturing the user and thread
posting statistics in these forums to understand the extent to which the dark-
web information can be useful as signals for predicting real world target specific
enterprise cyber attacks.
In the vulnerability lifecycle, a vulnerability goes through multiple stages.
It starts with being undisclosed when the general public does not know about it
and attackers can identify them, develop exploits and use them for “zero-day”
attacks. However, once a vulnerability is identified, an indexing is done with
an ID assigned to it - that is where the vendor starts working on a patch. Once
a patch is released, is when hackers would try to reverse engineer the patch
and develop exploits. The last stage would generally entail using metasploit
modules to launch these attacks via these exploits [5]. So in this vulnerability
lifecycle, the significance of discussions in darkweb forums or most social media
platforms can appear in two phases: once when the vulnerability is undisclosed
1 https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2016/09/yahoo-breach-watch
2 https://www.wombatsecurity.com/blog/scary-data-breach-statistics-of-2017
3 https://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/2017/05/29-increase-in-vulnerabilities-already-
disclosed-in-2017/
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 3
and there are discussions revolving around related vulnerabilities or exploits
and second, after the patch is released but before an exploit is materialized
for an attack. So our goal is to leverage the discussions in these two phases to
be able to predict cyber attacks before the exploit is weaponized.
We attempt to build an integrated approach utilizing unconventional sig-
nals from the darkweb discussions for predicting attacks on a target organi-
zation - here “unconventional” means that the information from the darkweb
might not necessarily be observables of the actual attacks on the target orga-
nization. This is in contrary to traditional studies where authors use system
level features within the target organization to predict attacks in future for the
same or related organization [23,8]. With this in mind, we hypothesize that
the interaction dynamics focused on a set of specialized users and the attention
broadcast by them to other posts in these underground platforms can be one of
ways to generate warnings for future attacks. We mine patterns of anomalous
behavior from these forums and use them directly for cyber attack prediction
on external enterprise host systems. We note that we do not consider whether
vulnerabilities mentioned in forum discussions, have been exploited or not as
the basis for attacks since a lot of zero day attacks [9] might occur before such
vulnerabilities are even indexed and their gravity might lie hidden in discus-
sions related to other associated vulnerabilities or some discussion on exploits.
The premise on which this research is setup is based on evaluating the dy-
namics of all kinds of discussions in the darkweb forums but we attempt to
filter out the noise to mine important patterns by studying whether a piece of
information gains traction within important communities. So in this sense we
do not explicitly focus on discussions relating vulnerabilities exclusively nor
their exploits to predict real world cyber attacks.
We try to quantify the correlation between the pattern of replies by a spe-
cific group of users we term experts who engage more frequently with popular
vulnerability mentions in their posts over time and which gain attention from
other users, and a real world cyber attack in the near future as a first challenge
in this study. A second research opportunity in this direction is to see whether
we can use company agnostic unsupervised models that overcome the lack of
company specific metadata from the attack ground truth. We investigate the
extent to which we can correlate anomalies from these darkweb network inter-
actions to near term cyber attacks and how well they materialize for different
companies. To this end, the major contributions of this research investigation
are as follows:
– We create a novel network mining technique using the directed reply net-
work of users to extract a set of specialized users we term experts whose
posts with popular vulnerability mentions gain attention from other users
in a specific time frame. Following this, we generate several time series of
features that capture the dynamics of interactions centered around these
experts across individual forums of the darkweb.
– We apply a widely used unsupervised anomaly detection technique that
uses residual analysis to detect anomalies and propose an anomaly based
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attack prediction technique on a daily basis. Additionally, we also train a
supervised learning model based on logistic regression with attack labels
from an organization to predict daily attacks.
– Empirical evidence from our unsupervised anomaly detector suggests that
a feature based on graph conductance that measures the random walk tran-
sition probability between groups of users is a useful indicator for attack
occurrences given that it achieved the best AUC score of 0.69 for one type
of attacks. We obtain similar best results for the supervised model having
the best F1 score of 0.53 for the same feature and attack type compared to
the random (without prior probabilities) F1 score of 0.37. We additionally
investigate the performance of the models in weeks where frequency of at-
tacks are higher and find the superior performance of community structures
in networks in predicting these attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is a first attempt in creating a frame-
work that investigates the network structure of the darkweb forums data as
an external source of information to generate alerts and predict real world
cyber attacks without having the need to monitor vulnerability prioritization
or exploitation.
2 Related Work and Motivation
In this work, we discuss some of the past and ongoing research in the domain
of cyber security analytics that also caters to the general area of predicting
future cyber breach incidents in real world systems. Most of the work on vul-
nerability discussions on trading, exploitation in the underground forums [10,
11,28] and related social media platforms like Twitter[14,13,12] have focused
on two aspects: (1) analyzing the dynamics of the underground forums and
the markets that drive it, thereby focusing on mechanisms that enable the
market activity, and giving rise to the belief that the “lifecycle of vulnerabil-
ities” in these forums and marketplaces have significant impact on real world
cyber attacks [21,9] (2) prioritization of vulnerabilities using these social me-
dia platforms or binary file appearance logs of machines and using them to
predict the risk state of machines or systems through exploitation of these vul-
nerabilities [8]. So, the two components in majority of these studies that have
been repeatedly worked upon in silos are analysis of vulnerabilities and their
likelihood of exploitation in these forums or platforms and, then vulnerability
exploitation severity based prediction to associate them to real world cyber
breach incidents [5,12]. In this paper, we ignore the gap between vulnerability
exploit analysis and the final task of real world cyber attack prediction by
removing the preconceived notions used in earlier studies where vulnerability
exploitation is considered a precursor towards attack prediction.
The rapid expansion of the cyber-threat landscape is augmented by the
presence of underground platforms that support the discussion, proliferation
of exploit awareness, deployment and monetization of such exploits leading
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Symbols Definition
f, F a particular (single) forum, set of forums considered in study
t discrete time point instance
A set of attack types: malicious-email, endpoint malware and malware destina-
tion
Γ global time range of points in our study {t1, t2 . . . tk}
τ an ordered subsequence of time points ∈ Γ
x feature in our study of machine learning based prediction models
h a thread in a forum ( a thread is a series of posts on a particular topic initiated
by a user)
ph,i in a chronologically ordered set of posts in thread h, it denotes the i
th post
(from beginning) in h
Tx,f a time series data for feature x from discussion posts in forum f
Rx residual vector time series data for feature x from discussion posts aggregated
over all forums
Hτ historical time period (prior to τ) w.r.t. τ , ∀t′ ∈ Hτ and for any t ∈ τ , t′ < t
and there is a time gap between the start of τ and end of Hτ
V fτ , E
f
τ set of nodes in reply network from forum f discussions and in time period τ ,
set of edges with the same constraints (we drop f when we generalize for all
forums)
GHτ Reply network induced by discussion in Hτ
expτ Experts in the time subsequence τ
X #features × T matrix (T denotes the time dimesnion)
Y T × F matrix
y 1 × F vector
β weight for a feature in the logistic regression model
η time window for feature selection in Tx,f
δ time gap between attack prediction at a time point and the feature window
ζ anomaly to attack prediction (anomaly) count threshold parameter
Table 1: Table of notations
to cyber-attacks [15,16,17,10]. However, despite the existing literature that
studies the economies of these underground forums and markets present in
the darkweb, there has been very few studies that focus on filtering the mar-
kets and forums that actually contribute to the threat scenario [18,19,20].
One of the ways to understand the indicators surrounding these underground
platforms, that could lead to potentially malicious attempts to breach systems
at scale is to monitor the interactions that receive attention in these platforms.
We discuss 3 areas within which our work falls when we discuss the land-
scape of cyber attack prediction based on signals from social media and attacks
on an organization. However, we point out the main differences that bring out
the significance and novelty of our approach and the problem we attempt to
solve in the following:
1. Cyber attack with within-organization system signals: Cyber attack predic-
tion on external organizations have recently been studied in the context
of feature engineering for gathering predictive signals. Some of the most
related works in this area include a study [1], where features are gathered
from the network systems and the log files of a target organization. These
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features are then used for training a classifier to predict future attacks
for the same organization, and where the ground truth for the attacks
are collected from reported cyber incidents from Web Hacking Database,
Hackmageddon. Contrary to this, we use unconventional signals from the
darkweb that are not necessarily observables of the attacks for the orga-
nization but we try to measure the extent to which they can perform well
over other measures. Similar to this study, there have already been at-
tempts to develop systems at scale that could predict the risk of systems
by analyzing various sensors such as binary appearance of log files [8].
2. Cyber attack prediction using social media data: There have been several
attempts to use external social media data sources to predict real world
cyber attacks [1,23,13,22]. However, the problem these studies focus on is
to build predictive models to correlate the social media signals to attacks
in the real world that are not observed for a specific organization. Our
attack prediction problem specifically proposes to build models specific to
an external organization using external sensors not obtained from the in-
ternal system data for the same organization. One of the closest works in
this area is done bu authors in [31], where the authors use signals using
GDELT, Twitter and OTX based on keywords related to the organization.
One of the challenges related to our dataset is that we did not find any
keywords directly related to the name of our target organization in the
darkweb - similar issues are reported in [30] where the authors relied on
some curated keyword search from Twitter and blogs and the darkweb for
attack prediction Our work has a slight advantage in that our selection of
forums and the features including vulnerability information does not de-
pend on human engineered knowledge, rather it focuses on the trends in
time - so in a sense our streaming nature of prediction is scalable.
3. Social Network analysis for cyber security : Using network analysis to un-
derstand the topology of darkweb forums has been studied at breadth in
[24] where the authors use social network analysis techniques on the re-
ply networks of forums in order to identify members of Islamic community
within the darkweb. Similarly in [25], the authors use topic modeling and
the network structure of the darkweb forums in order to understand the
interactions between extremist groups. However, such analysis of reply net-
works have been conducted on static networks [6] where authors devised
network features of users for predictive modeling. A recent study done in
[26] show how to leverage the network structure of these reply networks
for cyber attack prediction. These studies suggest that the nature of inter-
actions can unveil important actors in darkweb forums and their activity
regarding discussions can provide us with signals for cyber attacks. One of
our contributions in this paper is that we use evolving networks of the users
with certain constraints that can now be leveraged for streaming predic-
tion on a daily basis in an automated manner. Our hypothesis lies on the
premise that the attention broadcast by these users towards other posts
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are in fact sensors for impending cyber attacks. Such studies of separating
specialized users have been studied before in the context of trading finan-
cial information in carding forums [27].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we first introduce a few security
terminologies relevant to our work and the dataset sources and attributes in
Section 3, following which we formally define the prediction problem attempted
in this paper in Section 4. We then discuss the technical details of our attack
prediction framework including the feature engineering and the model learning
components in Section 5. We discuss the experimental settings and the results
in Section 6 and finally we end this work with some discussion and case studies
in Section 7.
3 Cyber Security terms and Dataset
We first introduce a few terms commonly used in the cyber security domain
and that we would use in this paper frequently. Vulnerability is a weakness
in a software system that can be exploited by an attacker to compromise the
confidentiality, integrity or availability of the system to cause harm [29].
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) : The database of Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures maintained on a platform operated by the MITRE
corporation4 provides an identity mapping for publicly known information-
security vulnerabilities and exposures.
Common Platform Enumeration (CPE): A CPE is a structured naming
scheme for identifying and grouping clusters of information technology sys-
tems, software and packages maintained in a platform NVD (National Vulner-
ability Database) operated by NIST5.
CVE - CPE mapping: Each CVE can be assigned to different CPE groups
based on the naming system of CPE families as described in [6]. Similarly, each
CPE family can have several CVEs that conform to its vendors and products
that the specific CPE caters to. For the purpose of this paper, we form a sim-
plified grouping hierarchy to cluster the CVEs by their CPE levels which we
describe in Section 3.3.
Forum topic: Each darkweb forum or site f consists of several threads h ini-
tiated by a specific user and over time, several users post and reply in these
threads. We note that one user can appear multiple times in the sequence of
posts depending on when and how many times the user posted in that thread.
Since each thread is associated with a topic (or a title), we would often use
the terms topic to refer to a particular thread h comprising all posts in the
relevant forum. We denote the set of these 53 forums used in this dataset using
the symbol F .
The ground truth and the darkweb data have been collected from two
different sources as will be described in the following sections and although we
4 https://www.mitre.org/
5 https://www.nist.gov/
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(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 1: Weekly occurrence of security breach incidents of different types (a)
Malicious email (b) Endpoint Malware (c) Malicious destination
validate our prediction models based on the available ground truth, we perform
extensive case studies to show the significance of our prediction models in the
real world.
3.1 Enterprise-Relevant External Threats (GT)
We use the cyber attacks Ground Truth (GT) from the data provided from a
corporate entity to funders of this work6. The corporate entity is Armstrong
Corporation to conceal the actual identity. The data contains information on
cyber attacks on their systems in the period of April 2016 to September 2017.
Each data point is a record of a detected deliberate malicious attempt to gain
unauthorized access, alter or destroy data, or interrupt services or resources in
the environment of the participating organization. Those malicious attempts
were real-world events detected in the wild, in uncontrolled environment, and
by different attack detectors such as anti-virus and IDS software and hard-
ware products. The data contains the following relevant attributes: { event-
type: The type of attack which are categorized as malicious-email, endpoint-
malware and malicious-destination, event occurred date: Date on which there
6 https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/cause
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was an attack of particular event-type, event reported date: Date on which the
attack was reported, detector : the software service that detected the system in-
trusion attempting to break into their systems, threat designation family : the
categories of threats from among a Threat Family Dictionary. }. The event-
types that are used in this study are:
– Malicious Email : A malicious attempt is identified as a Malicious Email
event if an email is received by the organization, and it either contains a
malicious email attachment, or a link (embedded URL or IP address) to a
known malicious destination.
– Malicious Destination: A malicious attempt is identified as visit to a Mali-
cious Destination if the visited URL or IP address hosts malicious content.
– Endpoint Malware: A Malware on Endpoint event is identified if malware
is discovered on an endpoint device. This includes, but not limited to,
ransomware, spyware, and adware.
We denote these set of attack types as A. Here the term “malicious” means
that the end goal of all these 3 attempts were to intrude the systems of the
host enterprise and exploit them, however to what extent are they successful
is not known and is not a matter of concern for an incident to be qualified as
a cyber-attack. In our research, we use the categories: event-type and attack
occurred date as our ground truth (GT) for validation and avoid the use of
other attributes present in the dataset as they are metadata provided by third
party software services which are not available for all security incident reports.
Additionally, since our research is focused on using the darkweb as an external
source of data to capture the behavioral patterns of user interactions, we only
use the event-type and event-occurred-date as our ground truth. We note that
the absence of information that can accurately provide us with information
regarding vulnerabilities and exploits that caused the attacks, for our model
validation makes the problem more challenging. As shown in Figure 1, the
distribution of attacks over time is different for the 3 events. Additionally, we
also observe that for the events endpoint-malware shown in Figure 1(b) and
malicious-destination shown in Figure 1(c), the weekly occurrence has not
been captured consistently and there is missing information for these events
in few time intervals. We take note of this while building our learning models
to predict the occurrence of an attack. The total number of incidents reported
for the events are as follows: 26 incidents tagged as malicious-destination, 119
tagged as endpoint-malware and 135 for malicious-email events resulting in a
total of 280 incidents over a span of 17 months that were considered in our
study.
3.2 Darkweb data
The entire focus of this research has been to disentangle the interactions cen-
tered around a few users over time and the noise that is present in the form
of random discussions in different forums. It helps us at assessing whether
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Fig. 2: Weekly distribution of unique vulnerability mentions in darkweb forums
posts across all forums.
they could be used as indicators for external cyber attacks in future without
having any knowledge of which CVEs or a group of CVEs might cause them.
Of course, in retrospective causal analysis, one can analyze the features that
led to the predictions of an attack or an alarm for an attack in the future.
However, since the attack data from Armstrong had no references to any
CVEs nor was it possible to trace any CVEs given the metadata information,
we resort to using the time frame of the GT attacks for gathering the dark-
web forum information and computing features based on this time frame so as
to train the models using data having close temporal associations. However,
we later provide a comprehensive discussion related to how our predictions
correlate with important time events of attacks in the real world and that
also correlate the attack ground truth data provided. We obtain darkweb and
deepweb data through a commercial platform7.
CVE data: Using the API, we collect all the information regarding the vul-
nerability mentions in the darkweb forums in the period from January 2016
to October 2017. The total number of unique CVE mentions in this period
are 3553 across all forums that are scraped by the SDK and the weekly dis-
tribution of the number of vulnerability mentions in the forums is shown in
Figure 2. We realize that for the months from January 2016 to May 2016,
there may be a collection bias in the vulnerability mentions in forum posts
but since we train our models over multiple months using these mentions, we
hope to overcome this collection bias error over time.
In fact, when we look at the distribution of the number of times one CVE
is mentioned in the darkweb (over the span of the time period of our study
that we considered), we found that on average a CVE would be mentioned 3.5
times in the darkweb forums, with a median value of 1. Figure 3 shows that the
probability of less mentions is very huge thus making the problem of selecting
discussions surrounding vulnerabilities even more difficult since prioritizing
7 Data is provided by Cyber Reconaissance, Inc., www.cyr3con.ai
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Fig. 3: Cumulative Distribution Function (cdf) showing the number of times
each CVE is mentioned in posts in the darkweb.
vulnerabilities without looking at the content or the user-user network is very
difficult.
Fig. 4: Distribution of the number of forums posts across all forums
Forums data: In this paper, we consider the dynamics of interactions in dark-
web forums and for that we filter out forums based on a threshold number of
posts that were created in the timeframe of January 2016 to September 2017.
We gathered data from 179 forums in that time period where the total number
of unique posts irrespective of the thread that they belonged to, were 557689.
As shown in Figure 4, the number of forums with less than 100 posts is large
and therefore we only consider forums which have greater than 5000 posts
in that time period which gave us a total of 53 forums. As will be described
later, we rely on a projection method to compute lower dimensional features
and hence any significant patterns occurring out of these forums would be cap-
tured without the requirement to manually filter and select particular forums.
We note that unlike some related research using darkweb for cyber attack
prediction which use large number of forums for obtaing signals for prediction
[30], we refrain from using forums with not enough data in the 1-year period of
our study. This is to avoid the issues of missing data on days where we would
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need to predict attacks - an imputation measure for this is an active area of
research [31] and we consider this as a step towards our future work.
3.3 CPE Groups
We gather the CPE data for all the vulnerabilities relevant to the darkweb
discussions in our study from the publicly available repository of CPE data.
In order to cluster the set of CVEs into a set of CPE groups, we use the
set of CPE tags for each CVE from the NVD database maintained by NIST.
For the CPE tags, we only consider the operating system platform and the
application environment tags for each unique CPE. Examples of CPE would
include: Micorsoft Windows 95, Canonical ubuntu linux, Hp elitebook 725 g3.
The first component in each of these CPEs denote the operating system plat-
form and the second component denotes the application environment and their
versions. Some of the CPE groups might be a parent cluster of another CPE
group. For example, Microsoft Windows would be a parent cluster for CPEs
like Microsoft Windows 8 or Microsft Windows 10. In this research, we do not
consider any hierarchies in the CPEs for filtering out clusters, but as future
research use, this can be considered. From our data we found that over the
time period from April 2016 to September 2017, the top CPE groups hav-
ing CVEs which are mentioned most widely in darkweb forum posts are ntp,
php, adobe flash player, microsoft windows server 2008, linux kernel, microsoft
windows 7, micorosft windows server 2012, and canonical ubuntu linux.
4 Prediction Problem
Before we describe our framework for using darkweb discussions in the forums
for predicting external enterprise attacks, we formally describe our prediction
task. Formally, given a target organization E, a set of unconventional (exter-
nal) signals from the darkweb forums as features and a set of A attack types
for E, we solve a binary classification problem that investigates whether there
would be an attack (0/1) of any type in A for E on a daily basis.
The mechanism for attack predictions as shown in Figure 5 can be de-
scribed in 3 steps : (1) given a time point t on which we need to predict
an enterprise attack of a particular event type (2) we use features from the
darkweb forums δ days prior to t and, (3) we use these features as input to
a machine learning model to predict attack on t. So one of the main tasks
involves learning the attack prediction model, one for each event type. We
describe the attack prediction framework in the following section.
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Fig. 5: The prediction task. We use unconventional time series signals from
the darkweb forum network to predict attack on a daily basis for company E.
5 Framework for Attack Prediction
Since we attempt at building an integrated framework leveraging the network
formed from the discussions in the forums as signals for predicting organization
specific attacks, we segregate it into the three steps of any classic machine
learning framework:
1. Feature engineering : As one of our contributions, we leverage the reply
network formed from the thread replies in forums to build features for
input to the model. To this end we build two kinds of features:
– Graph Based Features: Here we identify features pertaining to the dy-
namics of replies from users with credible knowledge to regular posts
- the intuition behind this is to see whether a post gaining attention
from active and reputed users can be a predictive signal.
– Forum metadata: We also gather some forum metadata as another set
of features and we use them as baselines for our graph based features.
So as a first step towards achieving this, we devise an algorithm to create
the reply network structure from the replies in the threads in this step
prior to feature computation.
2. Training (learning) models for prediction: In this step, we first split the
timeframe of our attack study into two segments: one corresponding to the
training span and the other being the test span. However, unlike normal
cross-validated machine learning models, we need to be careful about the
time split, since we consider longitudinal networks for features and the
training-test split should respect the forecasting aspect of our prediction
- we use features δ days prior to the day we predict the attacks for. So
instead of using cross-validation, we fix our training time span as the first
few time points in our ground truth dataset (chronologically ordered) and
the test span succeeding the training span. We build several time-series of
individual features from step 1 using only forum discussions in the training
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Unsupervised 
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Forum metadata and graph time 
series features for the  test span 
Test input
Fig. 6: An overview of the framework used for attack prediction.
span and use them as input along with the attack ground truth to a su-
pervised model for learning the parameters (we build separate models for
separate attack types and different attack organizations). This along with
step 1 is shown in Figure 6 on the left side under the training span stage.
3. Attack prediction: In this final step, we first compute the time series of
the same set of features in the test span, instead that we now use the
forum discussions in the test span (δ days prior to the prediction time
point). We input these time series into the supervised model as well as an
additional unsupervised model (that does not require any training using
ground truth), to output attacks on a daily basis in the test span. This
step is displayed in the right component of Figure 6.
In the following sections, we explain the steps in details that also describes
the intuition behind the approach used for attack prediction in our study.
5.1 Step 1: Feature Engineering
For the purposes of network analysis, we assume the absence of global user IDs
across forums8 and therefore analyze the social interactions using networks
induced on specific forums instead of considering the global network of all
users across all forums. We denote the directed and unweighted reply graph
of a forum f ∈ F by Gf = (V f , Ef ) where V f denotes the set of users who
8 Note that even in the presence of global user IDs across forums, a lot of anonymous or
malicious users would create multiple profiles across forums and create multiple posts with
different profiles, identifying and merging which is an active area of research.
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posted or replied in some thread in forum f at some time in our considered
time frame of data and Ef denotes the set of 3-tuple (u1, u2, rt) directed edges
where u1, u2 ∈ V f and rt denotes the time at which u1 replied to a post of u2
in some thread in f , u1 → u2 denoting the edge direction. We emphasize that
this notation of the network discards links between users of 2 different forums
as we did not connect or merge threads posted in two separate forums. We
denote by Gfτ = (V
f
τ , E
f
τ ), a temporal subgraph of G
f , τ being a time window
such that V fτ denotes the set of individuals who posted in f in that window
and Efτ denotes the set of tuples (v1, v2, rt) such that rt ∈ τ , v1, v2 ∈ V fτ .
5.1.1 Constructing the reply network
We adopt an incremental analysis approach by splitting the entire set of time
points in our frame of study (both for the training and test span) into a
sequence of time windows Γ = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τQ}, where each subsequence τi,
i ∈ [1,Q] is equal in time span and the subsequences are ordered by their
starting time points for their respective span. This streaming aspect of the
reply networks and the feature computation is based on our observation that
the significance of users (in terms of important posts in the forums) change
very rapidly and for a one year span, computing features for a month based on
historical information of users long time back is not convenient. From that per-
spective, we create evolving networks on a daily basis (but which incorporate
historical knowledge), and compute features on a daily basis. However, in more
realistic settings, the temporal resolution of these snapshots can be managed
dynamically based on how often consecutive networks change significantly in
terms of some distance metric as has been done in [32].
Next we describe the operations: Create - that takes a set of forum posts in
f within a time window τ as input and creates a temporal subgraph Gfτ and
Merge - that takes two temporal graphs as input and merges them to form an
auxiliary graph that incorporates historical information. To keep the notations
simple, we would drop the symbol f when we describe the operations for a
specific forum in F as context but which would apply for any forum f ∈ F . We
describe the two operations that describe how we map the features extracted
from network structure Gf to a time series, the analysis of which is the one of
contributions of our research:
1. CREATE: In this step, we create the reply network based on individual
threads within a forum f on a daily basis. Let h be a particular thread or
topic within a forum f containing posts by users V fh = {u1, . . . , uk} posted
at corresponding times T fh = {t1, . . . , tk}, where k denotes the number
of posts in that thread and ti ≥ tj for any i > j, that is the posts are
chronologically ordered. Since we are considering a reply network on the
forum posts, the lack of information as to who replied to whom necessitates
the use of some heuristics to connect the users based on temporal and
spatial information. We note that in situations where the data comes with
the hierarchical reply structure of who-replies-to-whom, this step can be
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Fig. 7: An illustration to show the Merge operation: GHτ denotes the historical
network using which the experts shown in gray are computed. {Gt1 , Gt2 , . . .}
denote the networks at time t1, t2, . . . ∈ τ , τ ∈ Γ . Note that the experts are
extracted only from GHτ and not on a regular basis.
avoided and can be skipped to the next stage. A simple approach would be
to consider either (i) a temporal constraint : for each user ui of a post in a
thread h in forum f at time ti, we would create an edge (ui, uk, t) such that
ti − tk < threshtemp, uk denotes the user for the respective posts at time
tk ∈ τ , threshspat denoting a time threshold or (ii) a spatial constraint :
consider all edges (ui, uk, ti), where uk denotes the user of the k
th post in
the time ordered sequence of posts and k − i ≤ thresh, thresh denoting
a count threshold. The idea behind reply edge construction based on the
combination of these two constraints is the following: in a time interval
where there are a lot of discussions, networks with the edges created from
the condition bounded by threshtemp would be unduly over-dense. Thus
the second condition bounds the number of posts (prior to its current post)
that a user can reach to while replying using its current post. In a way,
this ensures normalization since the hypothesis here is that a user can
only reach/reply to a certain number of posts prior to the current time
irrespective of how popular the discussions might be in a specific time
intervals.
We use both the constraints in the following way: for the ith post ph,i in
the thread h posted at time ti, the objective is to create links from the user
of this post to the posts prior to this as reply links. For this, we consider
a maximum of threshspat count of posts prior to ph,i (note the posts in
the thread are considered chronologically ordered), that is all posts ph,k
such that k− i ≤ threshspat. The users for those respective posts would be
the potential users to whom uh,i replied to (unidirectional links), which we
denote by {uh,i→k} and the corresponding set of posts {ph,i→k}. The next
layer of constraints considering temporal boundaries prune out candidates
from {uh,k}, using the following two operations:
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– If ti−tk < threshtemp, we form edges linking uh,i to all users in {uh,i→k}
(note the direction of reply). This takes care of the first few posts in h
where there might not be enough time to create a sensation, but anyhow
the users might be replying as a general discussion in the thread. So we
consider user of ith post replies potentially to all these users of {uh,i→k}
at one go whether it is at the beginning or whether it is in the middle
of an ongoing thread discussion.
– If ti − tk >= threshtemp, we first compute the mean of the time differ-
ences between two successive posts in {ph,i→k}. We also denote the time
difference between ti and the time of the last post in {ph,i→k} consid-
ering the chronological ordering is maintained (this is the post prior to
i), as ∆ti. If the computed mean is less than ∆ti, we form edges linking
uh,i to all users in {uh,i→k} (this is similar to the first constraint). Else,
as long as the mean is greater than ∆ti, we start removing the posts in
{ph,i→k} farthest in time to ti in order and recalculate the mean after
removal of such posts. We repeat this procedure until at some iteration
either the recomputed mean is less than ∆ti or ti − tk < threshtemp.
This heuristic considers the case for posts that receive a lot of replies
very frequently at certain time of the thread lifecycle, although it is
not reasonable to consider posts which have been posted a while ago as
being replied to by the current post in consideration.
Following this, V f = ∪hV fh and Ef = ∪hEfh , that is we remove multiple
interactions between the same set of users in multiple threads and without
weighting these edges. As before, a temporal subgraph of Gf would be de-
noted by Gfτ where (u, v, rt) ∈ Eτ denotes u replied to v at time rt ∈ τ .
Our objective after creating the reply network Gfτ is to compute features
from this network that could then be used as input to a machine learning
model for predicting cyber attacks. These features would act as the uncon-
ventional signals that we have been addressing in this paper for predicting
external enterprise specific attacks. In order to achieve that, we need to
form time series of a feature x (among a set of network features) denoted
by Tx,f for every forum f ∈ F separately: formally Tx,f is a stochastic
process that maps each time point t to a real number.
2. MERGE: In order to create a time series feature Tx,f for feature x from
threads in forum f , we use 2 reply networks: (1) a historical network GHτ
which spans over time Hτ such that ∀t′ ∈ Hτ , and for any t ∈ τ , we have
t′ < t, and (2) the network Gft induced by user interactions between users
in Et, which varies temporally for each t ∈ τ . We note that the historical
network GHτ would be different for each subsequence τ , so as the subse-
quences τ ∈ Γ progress with time, the historical network GHτ also changes,
and we discuss the choice of spans τ ∈ Γ and Hτ in Section 6. Finally, for
computing feature values for each time point t ∈ τ , we merge the 2 net-
works GHτ and Gt to form the auxiliary network GHτ ,t = (VHτ ,t, EHτ ,t),
where VHτ ,t = VHτ ∪ Vt and EHτ ,t = EHτ ∪ Et. A visual illustration of
this method is shown in Figure 7. At the end, we consider several network
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features over each GfHτ ,t and compute the feature values at time point t to
form Tx,f for feature x and forum f .
5.1.2 Network based features
We leverage the network GfHτ to compute features on a regular basis - the
advantage is that this network contains historical information but at the same
time, this historical information does not update on a regular basis. For ex-
tracting network based features, we want to be able to focus on the interactions
convened by users in forums with a knack towards posting credible informa-
tion. The objective is to investigate whether any spike in attention towards
posts on a day from such users with some credible reputation translates to pre-
dictive signals for cyber attacks on an organization. This would also in a way
help filter out noisy discussions or replies from unwanted or naive users who
post information irrelevant to vulnerabilities or without any malicious intent.
We hypothesize that predictive signals would exhibit users in these daily reply
networks whose posts have received attention (in the form of direct or indirect
replies) from some “expert” users - whether a faster reply would translate to
an important signal for an attack is one of the novel questions we tackle here.
In order to be able to extract posts that receive attention on a daily basis,
we first need to extract “expert” users who attention we seek to gather.
Expert Users. For each forum f , we use the historical network GfHτ to extract
the set of experts relevant to timeframe τ , that is expfτ ∈ V fHτ . First, we
extract the top CPE groups CP topτ in the time frame Hτ based on the number
of historical mentions of CVEs. These would be used as top CPEs for the span
τ . For this, we sort the CPE groups based on the sum of the CVE mentions
that belong to the respective CPE groups and take the top 5 CPE groups
by sum in each Hτ . Using these notations, the experts exp
f
τ from history Hτ
considered for time span τ are defined as users in f with the following three
constraints:
1. Users who have mentioned a CVE in their post in Hτ . This ensures that the
user engages in the forums with content that is relevant to vulnerabilities.
2. Let θ(u) denote the set of CPE tags of the CVEs mentioned by user u
in his/her posts in Hτ and such that it follows the constraint: either θ(u)
∈ CP topτ where the user’s CVEs are grouped in less than 5 CPEs or, CP topτ
∈ θ(u) in cases where a user has posts with CVEs in the span Hτ , grouped
in more than 5 CPEs. This constraint filters out users who discuss vulner-
abilities which are not among the top CPE groups in Hτ .
3. The in-degree of the user u in GHτ should cross a threshold. This con-
straint ensures that there are a significant number of users who potentially
responded to this user thus establishing u’s central position in the reply
network. These techniques to filter out relevant candidates based on net-
work topology has been widely used in the bot detection communities [36].
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We avoid using other centrality metrics instead of using the in-degree in
the third constraint since our focus here is not to judge the position of the
user from the centrality perspective (for example, high betweenness would not
denote the user receives multiple replies on its posts). Instead, we want to filter
out users who receive multiple replies on their posts or in other words their
posts receive attention. Essentially, these set of experts expτ from Hτ would
be used for all the time points in τ as shown in Figure 7. Our objective here
is to not consider the degree as the proxy for user importance in any terms.
Rather the degree indicates the number of replies it gets from other users.
Why focus on experts? To show the significance of these properties in com-
parison to other users, we perform the following hypothesis test: we collect the
time periods of 3 widely known security events: the Wannacry ransomware
attack that happened on May 12, 2017 and the vulnerability MS-17-010, the
Petya cyber attack on 27 June, 2017 with the associated vulnerabilities CVE-
2017-0144, CVE-2017-0145 and MS-17-010, the Equifax breach attack primar-
ily on March 9, 2017 with vulnerability CVE-2017-5638. We consider two sets
of users across all forums - expτ , where GHτ denotes the corresponding his-
torical network prior to τ in which these 3 events occurred and the second set
of users being all Ualt who are not experts and who fail either one of the two
constraints: they have mentioned CVEs in their posts which do not belong to
CP top or their in-degree in GHτ lies below the threshold. We consider GHτ
being induced by users in the last 3 weeks prior to the occurrence week of
each event for both the cases, and we consider the total number of interac-
tions ignoring the direction of reply of these users with other users. Let degexp
denote the vector of count of interactions in which the experts were involved
and degalt denote the vector of counts of interactions in which the users in
Ualt were involved. We randomly pick number of users from Ualt equal to the
number of experts and sort the vectors by count. We conduct a 2 sample t-test
on the vectors degexp and degalt. The null hypothesis H0 and the alternate
hypothesis H1 are defined as follows;
H0 : degexp ≤ degalt, H1 : degexp > degalt
The null hypothesis is rejected at significance level α = 0.01 with p-value
of 0.0007. This suggests that with high probability, experts tend to interact
more prior to important real world cyber-security breaches than other users
who randomly post CVEs.
Now, we conduct a second t-test where we randomly pick 4 weeks not
in the weeks considered for the data breaches, to pick users Ualt with the
same constraints. We use the same hypotheses as above and when we perform
statistical tests for significance, we find that the null hypothesis is not rejected
at α=0.01 with a p-value close to 0.05. This empirical evidence from the t-
test also suggests that the interactions with expτ are more correlated with
an important cyber-security incident than the other users who post CVEs
not in top CPE groups and therefore it is better to focus on users exhibiting
our desired properties as experts for cyber attack prediction. Note that the
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t − test evidence also incorporates a special temporal association since we
collected events from three interleaved timeframes corresponding to the event
dates and we did not select any timeframe to show the evidence.
Next, we describe the following graph based features that we use to com-
pute Tx,f [t] at time t, for which we also take as input the relevant experts
expτ . We describe 4 network features that capture this intuition behind the
attention broadcast by these users - the idea is that a cyber-adversary looking
to thwart the prediction models from working by curating similar reply net-
works using bots, would need to not only introduce such random networks but
would also have to get the desired attention from these experts which could be
far challenging to achieve given that human attention is known to be different
compared to bots. [33].
Graph Conductance. As studied in [34,35,37], social networks are fast mix-
ing: this means that a random walk on the social graph converges quickly
to a node following the stationary distribution of the graph. Applied to so-
cial interactions in a reply network, the intuition behind computing the graph
conductance is to understand the following: can we compute bounds of steps
within which any attention on a post would be successfully broadcast from
the non-experts to the experts when a post closely associated with an attack
is discussed [38]? One way of formalizing the notion of graph conductance
φ is: φ = min
X⊂V :pi(X)< 12
φX where φX , X being the set of experts here is de-
fined as: φExperts =
∑
x∈expτ
∑
y∈Vt\expτ pi(expτ )Pxy
pi(expτ )
, and pi(.) is the stationary
distribution of the network GHτ ,t. For subset of vertices expτ , its conductance
φExperts represents the probability of taking a random walk from any of the
experts to one of the users in Vt \ expτ , normalized by the probability weight
of being on an expert.
Applied to the reply network comprising both experts and the regular users,
the key intuition behind conductance as used here is: the mixing between expert
nodes and the users of important posts is fast, while the mixing between expert
nodes and regular nodes without important posts (in our view of importance as
seeking attention) is slow. So higher the value of conductance here, higher is
the probability that the experts are paying attention to the posts and so there
is a good chance that the conversations on those days could be reflective of a
cyber attack in future.
Shortest paths. To understand the dynamics of distance between the non-
experts and the set of experts prior to an attack, we compute the shortest dis-
tance metric between them as follows:
SP (expτ , Vt \ expτ ) = 1|expτ |
∑
e∈expτ minu∈Vt\expτ
se,u, where se,u denotes the
shortest path in the graph GHτ ,d from the expert e to a user u in the direction
of the edges. Since the edges are formed in the direction of the replies based
on time constraints, it also denotes how fast an expert replies in a thread that
leads back in time to a post by u. Such distance metrics have been widely used
in network analysis to understand the pattern of interactions [39].
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for computing Common Communities (CC)
Input: expτ , GHτ , (Vt, Et)
Output: CC(expτ , Vt \ expτ ) - the number of communities shared by Vt \ expτ with
expτ at t
1 communities = Louvain community(GHτ ) ; // dictionary storing node to
community index mapping
2 cexpSet ← () ;
3 foreach user u ∈ expτ do
4 cexpSet.add(communities[u]) ;
5 end
6 VHτ ,t ← VHτ ∪ Vt ;
7 EHτ ,t ← EHτ ∪ Et ;
8 CC(expτ , Vt \ expτ ) ← 0 ; // stores count
/* Iterate over the users in Vt who have not been assigned communities
from Hτ */
9 foreach user u ∈ Vt do
10 if u ∈ VHτ and communities(u) ∈ cexpSet then
11 CC(expτ , Vt \ expτ ) += 1;
12 end
13 else
14 foreach user v ∈ expτ do
/* Condition 1 */
15 if (v, u) ∈ EHτ ,t then
16 CC(expτ , Vt \ expτ ) += 1;
17 break ;
18 end
/* Condition 2 */
19 foreach user n ∈ inNeighbors(EHτ ,t, u) do
20 if communities(n) ∈ cexpSet then
21 CC(expτ , Vt \ expτ ) += 1;
22 break ;
23 end
24 end
25 end
26 end
27 end
28 return CC(expτ , Vt \ expτ )
Expert Replies. To analyze whether experts reply to users more actively when
there is an important discussion going on surrounding any vulnerabilities or
exploits, we compute the number of replies by an expert to users in Vt \ expτ .
We calculate the number of out-neighbors of expτ considering GHτ ,t.
Common Communities. To evaluate the role of communities in the reply net-
work and to assess whether experts engage with selected other users within a
community when an information gains attention and could be related to vul-
nerability exploitation, we use community detection on the networks GHτ . We
use the Louvain method [40] to extract the communities from a given network.
Since it is not computationally feasible to compute communities in GHτ ,t for
all the time points t ∈ τ , we first compute all the communities for the users
in the historical network GHτ . Following this, we use an approximation based
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Group Features Description
Expert centric
Graph Conductance
τx[t] =
∑
x∈expτ
∑
y∈Vt\expτ pi(expτ )Pxy
pi(expτ )
where pi(.) is the stationary distribution of the network GHτ ,t,
Pxy denotes the probability of random walk from vertices x to y.
The conductance represents the probability of taking a random
walk from any of the experts to one of the users in Vt \ expτ ,
normalized by the probability weight of being on an expert.
Shortest Path
τx[t] =
1
|expτ |
∑
e∈expτ minu∈Vt\expτ
se,u
where se,u denotes the shortest path from an expert e to user u
following the direction of edges.
Expert replies
τx[t] =
1
|expτ |
∑
e∈expτ |OutNeighbors(e)|
where OutNeighbors(.) denotes the out neighbors of user in the
network GHτ ,t.
Common Communi-
ties
τx[t] = {N (c(u) | c(u) ∈ cexperts ∧ u ∈ Vt \ expτ}
where c(u) denotes the community index of user u, cexperts that
of the experts and N (.) denotes a counting function. It counts
the number of users who share communities with experts.
Forum/User
Metadata
Number of threads τx[t] = |{h | thread h was posted on t}|
Number of users τx[t] = |{u | user u posted on t}|
Number of expert
threads
τx[t] = |{h | thread h was posted on t by users u ∈ experts}|
Number of CVE
mentions
τx[t] = |{CV E | CVE was mentioned in some post on t}|
Table 2: List of features used for learning. Each feature τx is computed sepa-
rately across forums.
on heuristics to compute the communities of new users Vnew = VHτ ,t \ VHτ .
Let cexperts denote the set of communities that users in expτ belong to follow-
ing the call to Louvain method in Line 1 of Algorithm 1. Let c(u) denote the
community index of a user u. We define the common communities measure as
follows: CC(expτ , Vt\expτ ) = {N (c(u)) | c(u) ∈ cexperts∧ u ∈ Vt\expτ}, that
is it measures the number of non-experts at time t ∈ τ that share the same
communities with expτ . We use 2 approximation constraints demonstrated
in Lines 16-25 of Algorithm 1 to assign a new user u ∈ Vnew to an expert
community as follows:
1. Condition 1 : If an expert has an incoming edge to u, we increase the count
of common communities by 1.
2. Condition 2 : If u has a incoming neighbor who shares a community in
the set of communities of experts, we increase the count of common com-
munities by 1. This is shown in Line 19 in the call to the InNeighbors()
method.
5.1.3 User/Forum Metadata features
In addition to the network features, we compute the following forum based
statistics for a forum f at time point t: (1) The number of unique vulnerabil-
ities mentioned in f at time t, (2) The number of users who posted in f , (3)
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the number of unique threads in f at time t, and (4) The number of threads
in which there was at least one expert post among all the posts in f at t.
A brief summary of all the features used in this study is shown in Table 2.
5.2 Training models for prediction
In this section, we explain how we use the time series features Tx,f across
forums in F described in the preceding section to predict an attack at any
given time point t. We consider 2 models for our framework: (1) a supervised
learning model in which the time series Tx is formed by averaging Tx,f across
all forums in f ∈ F at each time point t and then using machine learning
models for the prediction task and, (2) an unsupervised learning model in
which we take the time series Tx,f for each feature and each forum f separately
and then use dimensionality reduction techniques across the forums dimension.
Following this, we use anomaly detection methods for the prediction task - this
model does not use the training span ground truth attack data and directly
works on features in the training and test span to predict attacks. However,
in the supervised learning scenario we build separate prediction models for
each attack type in A and for each organization separately. We do not use
the two learning models in conjunction nor do we combine data from different
attack types together - we leave that as a future work to see how models built
on one attack type could generalize to other types and whether we can use
different attack types together as a multi-label classification problem although
such models of synthesis have been used previously for attack prediction[41].
We treat the attack prediction problem in this paper as a binary classification
problem in which the objective is to predict whether there would be an attack
at a given time point t (Refer Figure 5). Since the incident data in this paper
contains the number of incidents that occurred at time point t, we assign a
label of 1 for t if there was at least one attack at t and 0 otherwise.
5.2.1 Supervised Learning
We first discuss the technical details of the machine learning model that learns
parameters based on the given training labels of different attack types in A in
the training span and uses them to predict whether an organization E would
be vulnerable to an attack of some type in A at t - we note again that we build
different models for each attack type in A for E, so predicting for each type
means that we have to learn different models for the types, however the set of
time series features gathered in the previous step as input is consistent across
all models. In [53,43], the authors studied the effect of longitudinal sparsity in
high dimensional time series data, where they propose an approach to assign
weights to the same features at different time spans to capture the temporal
redundancy. We use 2 parameters: δ that denotes the start time prior to t from
where we consider the features for prediction and η, the time span (window)
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Fig. 8: Temporal feature selection window for predicting an attack at time t
for the features to be considered. An illustration is shown in Figure 8 where
to predict an attack occurrence at time t, we use the features for each time t
∈ [t−η−δ, t−δ]. We use logistic regression with longitudinal ridge sparsity that
models the probability of an attack as follows:
P (attack(t) = 1| X) = 1
1 + e−(β0+
∑δ
k=η+δ βk xt−k)
(1)
The final objective function to minimize over N instances where N here
is the number of time points spanning the attack time frame is : l(β) =
−∑Ni=1(yi(β0 + xiTβ)− log(1 + expβ0+xiT β) + λβTβ. T
To obtain the aggregate series Tx from individual forum features Tx,f , we
just average the values across all forums for each time point. Here we use
each feature separately although later we discuss the combinations of features
together with sparsity constraints in Section 6.2.3.
5.2.2 Unsupervised Learning
Now, we discuss the unsupervised learning model that directly takes as input
the time series features in the training span as input and predicts the attacks
for types in A on an organization E in the test span. However, unlike the
supervised model, this model’s prediction output does not depend on the type
of attacks or the organization - E. It produces the same output for any at-
tack - we try to see how do anomalies from such unconventional signals in the
darkweb correlate with the attacks in the real world. Informally, anomalies
are patterns in data that do not conform to a well defined notion of normal
behavior. The problem of finding these patterns is referred to as anomaly de-
tection [44,45]. The importance of anomaly detection comes from the idea that
anomalies in data translate to information that can explain actionable devia-
tions from normal behavior thus leading to a cyber attack. We use subspace
based anomaly detection methods that take as input, Tx,f , aggregates them
across all forums and finds anomalies in the cumulative time series for feature
x. We derive motivation for this technique from the widely used projection
based anomaly detection methods [46,47] that detects volume anomalies from
the time series of network link traffic. Additionally, there have been techniques
in graph based anomaly detection that finds graph objects that are rare and
considered outliers [48]. However, our motivation behind using anomaly detec-
tion does not lie from a feature analysis perspective or finding anomalous users
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 25
(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 9: (a) The time series T for the number of users feature computed on a
daily basis and averaged across all forums F (b) The SPE state time series
vector after subspace separation (not averaged) (c) The SPE residual time
series vector R after subspace separation (not averaged).
but from a time series perspective - we observed that there could be spikes in
time series of the same feature in different forums on different days. The ques-
tion is how do we aggregate information from these spikes together instead of
averaging them to an extent that the spikes die out in the aggregate. From
that perspective, we find that the method used in [46] suits our framework -
we want to be able to filter out the spikes from the same feature computed
in different forums while projecting the dimension space of several forums to
a 1-dimensional subspace. The overall procedure for detecting anomalies from
the time series data on each feature has been described through the following
steps. We will again drop the subscript x to generalize the operations for all
features.
Aggregating time series. We create a matrix Y with dimensions (# time
points) × (F), the rows denoting values at a single time step t for forums
f ∈ F . While Y denotes the set of measurements for all forums F , we would
also frequently work with y, a vector of measurements from a single timestep
t.
Subspace Separation. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [49] is a method
to transform the coordinates of the data points by projecting them to a set
of new axes which are termed as the principal components. We apply PCA
on matrix Y, treating each row of Y as a point in RF . Applying PCA to Y
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yields a set of F principal components, {v}Fi=1. In general,the kth principal
component vk is: vk = arg max
‖v‖=1
‖(Y −∑k−1i=1 YvivTi )v‖. We determine the
principal axes (components) by choosing the first few components that capture
the maximum variance along their direction. Once these principal axes have
been determined, the matrix Y can be mapped onto the new axes leading to
as residual or anomalous subspace.
For detecting anomalies, we need to separate the vectors y ∈ RF at any
timestep into normal and anomalous components. We will refer to these as the
state and residual vectors of y. The key idea in the subspace-based detection
step is that, once S and S˜ have been constructed, the separation can be done by
projecting y onto these subspaces. We tend to decompose this y as: y = yˆ+ y˜.
For this, we arrange the set of principal components corresponding to the
normal subspace (v1,v2, . . . ,vr) as columns of a matrix P of size f × r where
r denotes the number of normal principal axes determined from the previous
step. We can then form yˆ and y˜ as:
yˆ = PPTy = Cy and y˜ = (I−PPT )y = C˜y (2)
where the matrix C = PPT represents the linear operator that performs
projection onto the normal subspace, and C˜ likewise projects onto the residual
subspace. Here yˆ is referred to as the state vector and y˜ as the residual vector.
Detection of anomalies. The idea of anomaly detection is to monitor the
residual vector that captures abnormal changes in y. As mentioned in [46,
50], there have been substantial research into designing statistical metrics for
detecting abnormal changes in y˜ using thresholding and we use one of the
widely used metrics, the squared prediction error (SPE) on the residual vec-
tor: SPE ≡ ‖y˜‖ ≡ ‖C˜y‖2. This gives the SPE residual vector and when
combined over all time points gives us the residual vector time series denoted
by R. The SPE residual vector at any time point is considered normal if
SPE ≤ δ2α, where δ2α denotes the threshold for the SPE at the 1 - α confi-
dence level. We keep this threshold dynamic and would use it as a parameter
for evaluating the anomaly based prediction models later on described in Sec-
tion 6. Figure 9 demonstrates the decomposition of the time series into the
SPE state and residual vectors. While Figure 9(b) captures most of the normal
behavior, the SPE residual time series in Figure 9(c) captures all the anoma-
lies across all the forums. The key point of this anomaly detection procedure
is that instead of monitoring the time series feature Tx,f separately across all
forums in F for predicting cyber attacks, we have reduced it to monitoring
the SPE residual time series Rx for cyber attacks.
5.3 Attack prediction
Anomaly detection to Attack prediction. Following the subspace projection
method to obtain Rx denoting the SPE residual vector, from the input time
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series feature Tx,f for all forums f ∈ F , we use threshold mechanisms on Rx to
flag the time point t as an anomaly if Rx[t] is greater than a threshold value.
Given any test time point t as the test instance, we first project the times series
vector Tx[t−(η+δ) : t(−δ)] that contains the information of feature x across all
forums in F , on the anomalous subspace C˜ = I−PPT given in Equation 2, if
that time window is not already part of the training data. Following this, we
calculate the the squared prediction error (SPE) that produces a 1-dimensional
vector ytest of dimension Rη×1. We count the number of anomalous time points
ta, denoted by N (ta), with ta ∈ [t−(η+δ), t(−δ)], time points that cross a chosen
threshold. Finally, we flag an attack at t if N (ta) >= max(1, ζ7 ). This metric
gives a normalized count threshold over a week for any ζ and for this window
parameter ζ being less than a week, we just count whether there is at least
one anomaly in that time gap. The fact that we avoid the attack ground
truth data to learn event based parameters has some pros and cons : while
in the absence of sufficient data for training supervised models, such anomaly
detectors can serve a purpose by investigating various markers or features for
abnormal behavior leading to attack, the disadvantage is such methods cannot
be tailored to specific events or specific attack types in organizations.
Supervised model prediction. For the logistic regression model, we first create
the features time series Tx for the test span and use it to calculate the prob-
ability of attack in Equation 1. When the probability is greater than 1, we
output a positive attack case else we predict a no-attack case.
6 Experiments and Results
6.1 Parameter settings
In our work, the granularity for each time index in the T function is 1 day,
that is we compute feature values over all days in the time frame of our study.
For incrementally computing the values of the time series, we consider the
time span of each subsequence τ ∈ Γ as 1 month, and for each τ , we consider
Hτ = 3 months immediately preceding τ . That is, for every additional month
of training or test data that is provided to the model, we use the preceding
3 months to create the historical network and compute the corresponding
features on all days in τ . As mentioned earlier, this streaming nature of feature
generation ensures we engineer the features relevant to the timeframe of attack
prediction. For choosing the experts with an in-degree threshold, we select a
threshold of 10 (we tried the values in the list [5, 10, 15, 20]) to filter out users
having in-degree less than 10 in GHτ from expτ . We obtain this threshold by
manually investigating a few experts in terms of their content of posts and we
find that beyond a threshold of 10, a lot of users get included whose posts are
not relevant to any malicious information or signals.
For the reply network construction, we have 2 parameters: threshspat and
threshtemp corresponding to the spatial and temporal constraints. For setting
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both these constraints, we used a 2D grid search over these parameters by
constructing the reply network using pairwise combinations of these 2 param-
eters. Following this, for each combination we fit the in-degree distribution to
power law with an exponent of 1.35. We fix the power law exponent based on
a study [51] done where the authors found that a reply network which was
created when the thread reply hierarchy was known in 2 forums, was best
fit to a power law (in-degree distribution) when the exponents were in the
range [1.35, 1.75]. We take the pair combination which gives us the minimum
difference when we calculate the error arising from our degree distribution
and p(k) ∼ k−1.35. Using this procedure we found threshspat=10 (posts) and
threshtemp= 15 (minutes) to have the best fit in terms of the reply network
we created.
The hyper-parameters for the logistic regression model η and δ have been
selected using a cross validation approach which we discuss briefly in the Re-
sults section. Similarly for detection of anomalies, the threshold parameter for
the residual vector δ2α mentioned in Section 5.3, we test it on different values
and plot the ROC curve to test the performance. For the choice anomaly count
threshold parameter ζ, such that we tag a cyber attack on t when the count of
anomalies in the selected window t−η−δ, t−δ crosses ζ, we set it to 1. The rea-
son behind this is from manual observation where we find very days on which
there are spikes and therefore, as a simple method, we just attribute an attack
to a day if there was at least one anomaly in the time window prior to it. We
do realize that this parameter needs to be cross-validated but our observations
suggest that there would be very low precision in the performance when ζ is
set to a high value.
6.2 Results
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the features on real world cyber attacks,
we perform separate experiments with the learning models described in Sec-
tion 5.2: while for the anomaly detection based prediction, we use the same set
of features as the only input for attack prediction across different attack types,
for the supervised model, we build different learning models using the ground
truth available from separate attack types in A. Additionally we only perform
supervised classification for the malicious−email and the endpoint−malware
attack types leaving out malicious−destination due to lack of sufficient train-
ing data. As mentioned in Section 5.2, we consider a binary prediction problem
in this paper - we assign an attack flag of 1 for at least 1 attack on each day
and 0 otherwise have the following statistics: for malicious-email, out of 335
days considered in the dataset, there have been reported attacks on 97 days
which constitutes a positive class ratio of around 29%, for endpoint-malware
the total number of attack days are 31 out of 306 days of considered span in
the training dataset which constitutes a positive class ratio of around 10%,
and for endpoint-malware we have a total of 26 days of attack out of a total of
276 days considered in the training set that spanned those attack days consti-
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Train posi-
tive sample
Train neg-
ative sam-
ples
Test posi-
tive sam-
ples
Test neg-
ative sam-
ples
Malicious email 65 178 32 60
Endpoint Malware 49 134 31 92
Malware Destina-
tion
7 115 8 84
Table 3: Statistics of the training and test samples from Armstrong.
tuting a positive class ratio of 9.4%. Table 3 shows the statistics of the training
and test data for the 3 cyber attacks types from Armstrong. Although we did
not use remedial diagnostics in our learning models to account for this class
imbalance, the absence of a large training dataset and the missing attack data
information accounting for irregularities make a strong case for using sampling
techniques to address these issues which we leave as a future research direction
for cyber attack focused studies. One of the challenges in remedial diagnostics
for imbalances in classes is that here we need to take into account the temporal
dependencies while incorporating any sampling techniques as remedies. How-
ever, we run a complementary experiment using SMOTE sampling as a simple
measure for introducing synthetic samples into the training dataset which we
discuss in Section 6.2.2.
For evaluating the performance of the models on the dataset, we split the
time frame of each event into 70%-30% averaged to the nearest month sepa-
rately for each event− type. That is we take the first 70% of time in months as
the training dataset and the rest 30% in sequence for the test dataset. We avoid
shuffle split as generally being done in cross-validation techniques in order to
consider the consistency in using sequential information when computing the
features. As shown in Figures 1, since the period of attack information pro-
vided varies in time for each of the events, we use different time frames for
the training model and the test sets. For the event malicious email which re-
mains our primary testbed evaluation event, we consider the time period from
October 2016 to May 2017 (8 months) in the darkweb forums for our training
data and the period from June 2017 to August 2017 (3 months) as our test
dataset, for the endpoint−malware, we use the time period from April 2016
to September 2016 (6 months) as our training time period and June 2017 to
August 2017 (3 months) as our test data for evaluation.
6.2.1 Unsupervised model prediction performance
Here we use the subspace projection method described in Sections 5.2.2, to
filter out anomalies from the SPE residual time series vector Rx. We then
use these anomalies to predict the attacks as described there and try to see
the tradeoffs between the number of true alerts and the number of false alerts
obtained. We consider the first 8 principal components among the 53 forums
that we considered. Among them we used the first 3 as the normal axes and
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(a) malicious-email (b) malicious-email
(c) endpoint-malware (d) endpoint-malware
(e) malicious-destination (f) malicious-destination
Fig. 10: ROC curves for prediction using unsupervised anomaly detection
methods: δ = 7 days, η=8 days
the rest 5 as our residual axes based on empirical evidence that shows these 3
components capture the maximum variance.
For evaluating the prediction performance, we examined the ROC (Re-
ceiver Operating Characteristic) curves for the features over different spans of
δ and η but we present our keys findings from the case where we set η=8 days
and δ=7 days shown in Figure 10 although we did not find general conclusions
over the choices of the parameters η and δ from the results. Each point in
these ROC curves denotes a threshold among a set of values chosen for flag-
ging a point in the vector obtained from the squared prediction error of the
projected test input y, that crosses the threshold as an anomaly. We present
the results in each plot grouped by the event − type and the feature classes:
forum statistics and graph based statistics. From the Figures 10(a) and (b),
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for the event type malicious − email, we obtain the best AUC (Area Under
Curve) results of 0.67 for the vulnerability mentions by users feature among
the forum statistics groups and an AUC of 0.69 for graph conductance among
the set of graph based features. For the event type malicious−destination, we
obtained a best AUC of 0.69 for the common community count feature among
the set of graph based features and a best AUC of 0.66 on the number of users
at td among the forum statistics. For the event-type endpoint−malware, we
obtain a best AUC of 0.69 on the number of users stats and 0.63 on the com-
mon communities CC feature. Empirically, we find that among the network
features examined that rely on the set of experts, it is not sufficient to just look
at how these experts reply to other users in terms of frequency, shown by the
results where they exhibit the least AUC in the unsupervised setting that we
considered. The fact that common communities and the graph conductance
turn out to be better predictors than just the shortest path distance or the
number of replies by experts, suggest that experts tend to focus on posts of a
few individuals when any significant post arises and hence, focusing on indi-
viduals who are close to these users in terms of random walks and communities
would be favorable.
One of the reasons behind the poor performance of the detector on the
malicious − destination type of attacks compared to malicious − email al-
though the total number of incidents reported for both of them are nearly the
same is that the average number of incidents for any week of attack for the 3
attack-types are: for malicious− email, we have an average of 2.9 attacks per
week, for endpoint−malware, we have an average of 3.6 attacks per week and
for malicious − destination, there are an average of 1.52 attacks per weeks.
So although the number of incidents are similar, the number of days of attacks
on which the attack occurs is lesser for malicious − destination attacks and
which is important for the binary classification problem considered here.
6.2.2 Supervised model prediction performance
For the logistic regression model, we consider a span of 1 week time window η
while keeping δ = 8 days similar to the unsupervised setting. Due to absence of
sufficient positive examples, we avoid using this model for predicting attacks
of type malicious−destination. From among the set of statistics features that
were used for predicting malicious− email attacks shown in Figure 11(b), we
observe the best results using the number of threads as the signal for which
we observe a precision of 0.43, recall of 0.59 and an F1 score of 0.5 against
the random F1 of 0.34 for this type of attacks. From among the set of graph
based features, we obtain the best results from graph conductance with a pre-
cision of 0.44, recall of 0.65 and an F1 score of 0.53 which shows an increase
in recall over the number of threads measure. Additionally, we observe that
in case of supervised prediction, the best features in terms of F1 score are
graph conductance and shortest paths whereas number of threads and vulner-
ability mentions turn out to be the best among the statistics. For the attacks
belonging to the type endpoint−malware, we observe similar characteristics
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(a) malicious-email (b) malicious-email
(c) endpoint-malware (d) endpoint-malware
Fig. 11: Classification results for the features considering the supervised model:
δ = 7 days, η = 8 days.
for the graph features where we obtain a best precision of 0.34, recall of 0.74
and an F1 score of 0.47 against a random F1 of 0.35, followed by the shortest
paths measure. Howeve,r for the statistics measures we obtain a precision of
0.35, recall 0.61 and an F1 score of 0.45 for the vulnerability mentions fol-
lowed by the number of threads which gives us an F1 score of 0.43. Although
the common communities features doesn’t help much in the overall prediction
results, in the following section we describe a special case that demonstrates
the predictive power of the community structure in networks. The challeng-
ing nature of the supervised prediction problem is not just due to the issue
of class imbalance, but also the lack of large samples in the dataset which if
present, could have been used for sampling purposes. As an experiment, we
also used Random Forests as the classification model, but we did not observe
any significant improvements in the results over the random case, suggesting
the LR model with temporal regularization helps in these cases of time series
predictions.
Additionally, we use SMOTE to deal with the class imbalance and we plot
the results for the malicious email attacks in Figure12 - from the results and
comparing them with those in Figure 11, we find that while for all features
the recall increases, the precision drops substantially. We find that among
the graph features, both graph conductance and the number of expert replies
perform equally well with an F1 score of 0.52 while the number of threads
with CVE mentions achieves the best results with an F1 score of 0.49.
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Fig. 12: Classification results for the malicious-email attack dataset using
SMOTE sampling on top of the supervised learning model
6.2.3 Model with feature combinations
One of the major problems of the dataset is the imbalance in the training and
test dataset as will be described in Section 6. The added complexities arise
from the fact that if we consider all features over the time window of feature
selection, then the total number of features z (variables) for the learning mod-
els is: z = # features × (η). In our scenario, this would typically be almost
equal to the number of data points we have for training depending on η and
also depending on whether we consider different variations of the features in
Table 2, which might result in overfitting. So in order to use all features in
each group together for prediction, we use 3 additional regularization terms
in the longitudinal regression model : the L1 penalty, the L2 penalty and the
Group Lasso regularization [52]. We adapt this framework of regularization to
our set of features following previous studies on lasso for longitudinal data [53]
and the final objective function can be written as:
l(β) = −
N∑
i=1
log(1 + e−yi(β
Txi)) +
m
2
‖β‖22 + l‖β‖1 + g.GL(β) (3)
where m, l and g are the hyper-parameters for the regularization terms and
the GL(β) term is
∑G
g=1‖βIg‖2, where Ig is the index set belonging to the gth
group of variables, g = 1 . . . G. Here each g is the time index th ∈ [t−η−δ, t−δ],
so this group variable selection selects all features of one time in history while
reducing some other time points to 0. It has the attractive property that it
does variable selection at the temporal group level and is invariant under
(group-wise) orthogonal transformations like ridge regression. We note that
while there are several other models that could be used for prediction that
incorporates the temporal and sequential nature of the data like hidden markov
models (HMM) and recurrent neural networks (RNN), the logit model allows
us to transparently adjust to the sparsity of data, specially in the absence of a
large dataset. For the model with the Group lasso regularization in Equation 3,
we set the parameters m, l, g and 0.3, 0.3 and 0.1 based on a grid search on m
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Fig. 13: Classification results for malicious email with feature combination
and considering group lasso: m=0.3, l=0.3, g=0.1. Refer to Equation 3 for the
model used for this prediction.
an l and keeping g low so that most time points within a single feature is set
to 0 for avoiding overfitting.
We cross validated this model on the 2 hyper-parameters: η and δ and we
found that while the recall increases for all combinations of hyper-parameters
for all features compared to results shown in Figure 11, the precision remains
the same across different values of the hyper-parameters. We test on different
η keeping δ fixed at 8 days and we test on different δ keeping η fixed at 7
days. We obtain the best results predicting attacks for the malicious-email
type using n = 7 and δ = 8 days - we get a best F1 value of 0.56 (using eta
= 7 days and keeping delta fixed at 8) using this feature combination model
against the best F1 score of 0.53 obtained from using single features without
regularization.
7 Discussions
As with most machine learning models and setups that attempt binary and
multiclass classification including neural networks, the features attributed to
the predictions can in most situations explain correlation - the causation needs
more controlled studies like visualization by projecting features onto a lower
dimensional space, ablation studies or understanding feature importance and
using regularization techniques for ensuring sparsity for some features or elim-
inating redundancy [54]. To this end, we try to investigate whether our frame-
work with the signals from the darwkeb discussions correlate to real world
events or to other types of attacks. We present 3 controlled studies that show
the extent to which the results of our framework are interpretable.
7.1 Prediction in High Activity Weeks
One of the main challenges in predicting external threats without any method
to correlate them with external data sources like darkweb or any other database
is that it is difficult to validate which kinds of attacks are most correlated with
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these data sources. To this end, we examine a controlled experiment setup for
the malicious− email attacks in which we only consider the weeks which ex-
hibited high frequency of attacks compared to the overall timeframe: in our
case we consider weeks having more than 5 attacks in test time frame. These
high numbers may be due to multiple attacks in one or few specific days or
few attacks on all days. The main idea is to see how well does the supervised
model perform in these weeks of interest compared to the random predictions
with and without prior distribution of attack information. We run the same
supervised prediction method but evaluate them only on these specific weeks.
Fig. 14: Classification results for malicious− email attacks in high frequency
weeks, δ = 7 days and η = 8 days.
From the results shown in Figure 14, we find that the best results were
shown by the common communities feature having a precision of 0.7 and a
recall of 0.63 and an F1 score of 0.67 compared to the random (no priors) F1
score of 0.48 and a random (with priors) F1 score of 0.34 for the same time
parameters. Among the statistics measures, we obtained a highest F1 score
of 0.63 for the vulnerability mentions feature. Additionally, we find unlike the
results over all the days, for these specific weeks, the model achieves high
precision while maintaining comparable recall emphasizing the fact that the
number of false positives are also reduced during these periods. This empir-
ically suggests that for weeks that exhibit huge attacks, looking at Darwkeb
sources for vulnerability mentions and the network structure analytics can
definitely help predict cyber attacks.
7.2 Real World Attacks
In order to assess whether the features and the learning model are predictive
of vulnerability exploitation based cyber attack incidents in the real world, we
manually collected one case of vulnerability exploitation that led to real world
attacks and which had discussions on the darkweb associated with those vul-
nerabilities. Since our main evaluations were reported on the malicious email
incidents and as mentioned before, the malicious-email events are caused by
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Fig. 15: Lifecycle of darkweb forum mentions of the vulnerability CVE-2017-
0199.
malicious email attachments which when downloaded could cause a malicious
script to run and execute its code thus intruding the host systems.
CVE-2017-0199. This vulnerability is exploited through malicious Microsoft
Office RTF documents that allows a malicious actor to download and execute
a Visual Basic Script when the user opens the document containing the ex-
ploit. As reported in several documents 9, the document can be sent through
an email or a link attachment and therefore is an example of malicious-email
breach. This vulnerability has a CVS severity score of 7.8 which is consid-
ered high by NIST 10. There were reports of systems being exploited several
months even following the patched date of this vulnerability. In this respect,
this vulnerability captured a lot of attention due to the widespread damage
that it created. The lifecycle of that vulnerability in the darkweb is shown in
Figure 15.
Although Microsoft released the patch on April 11, 2017 11, discussions
started as early as April 12 on the darkweb and there were 18 discussions
mentioning the vulnerability on April 13, 2017. When we looked at the con-
tent of the discussions on April 13, 2017, we found that most of the discussions
surrounding users trying to execute the exploit - whether with malicious in-
tentions or not is a research of sentiment analysis which is also conducted in
this domain [55,56]. When we looked at the attacks in the same and following
weeks from Armstrong’s malicious email incidents dataset, we found that the
first attack occurred on April 13, 2018 and in the following week there were
attacks on 3 consecutive days April, 26, 27 and 28 as shown in Figure 16(b).
9 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-
handler.html, https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-
2017-0199
10 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0199
11 https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/04/cve-2017-0199.html
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 16: (a) The graph conductance measure plotted for the weeks from April
11 2017 to April 2017. The red line denotes the threshold δα above which an
anomaly is flagged for that day. (b) The actual attack vector and the predicted
attacks in the same weeks.
The period contained a total of 5 days of reported malicious-email incidents
in the span of 20 days considered.
We use η=7 days, and τ=8 days for the features (the same parameters
used in the previous experiments) and we set ζ=7, that is we flag a day t as
an anomaly if N (t) ≥ 1, or in other words if there is at least one anomaly
flagged in the time period [t−η−δ, t−δ]. For setting the thresholds that cap-
tures whether a particular day has an anomaly in terms of the feature values,
we kept the threshold to the mean of the feature values obtained from the
training dataset for the respective features. Here we show the feature Graph
Conductance for the weeks in Figure 16(a), the red line denoting the mean
of the training data. We flag any day t as having an anomaly if the graph
conductance on that day crosses the red line. This setup was able to predict
the attacks on days April 26, 27 and 28 successfully while missing the attacks
on April 13 and April 14. This led to a precision of 0.26 and recall of 0.6 and
an F1 score of 0.46 in those 20 days. We have two important observations: first
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(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 17: Weekly occurrence of security breach incidents for Dexter of different
types (a) Malicious email (b) Endpoint Malware (c) Malicious destination
it is clear that the predicted attacks on the 3 days were due to the anomalies
raised in the previous 2 weeks as shown in Figure 16(b) and secondly, although
the CVE mentions shown in Figure 15 does not show any spikes on April 19,
20, 21 , 22 and our feature anticipated some anomaly on those days which
caused the alerts in the following weeks.
7.3 Experiments with another security breach dataset
One of the reasons behind using Armstrong dataset as our ground truth data
is the length of the time frame over which the attack data was available - not
just the number of attack cases reported (one could have a lot of attack cases
reported for only a few days). Since we are attempting a binary classification
problem, the more spread the attacks are, the more training point we have
for our models and test points for evaluation. However, as a complementary
experiment on the learnability of the model parameters specific to companies,
we test the prediction problem on a dataset of security incidents from another
company named Dexter.As shown in Figure 1, the distribution of attacks over
time is different for the events. We observe that compared to the Armstring
dataset, the time span for which the attack ground truth data is available is
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(a) malicious-email (b) malicious-email
(c) endpoint-malware (d) endpoint-malware
Fig. 18: Classification results on Dexter events for the features considering the
supervised model: δ = 7 days, η = 8 days.
much shorter - we obtained around 5 months of attack data for the 3 events
shown in Figure 17, starting from April 2016 to August 2016. We have 58
distinct days with at least one incident tagged as malicious-destination, 35
distinct days tagged as endpoint-malware and 114 distinct days for malicious-
email events. We had a total of 565 incidents (not distinct days) over a span of
5 months that were considered in our study which is twice the number reported
for Armstrong. However, compared to the data spread over 17 months obtained
from Armstrong, we have only 4 months to train and test using Dexter data.
We use the same attack prediction framework for predicting the attacks
on Dexter, the results of which are shown in Figure 18 - we obtain the best
F1 score of 0.6 on the malicious email attacks using the graph conductance
measure and an F1 score of 0.59 using the expert threads statistics forum
metadata feature (refer to Table 2) against a random F1 score of 0.37. This
suggests that the network features which on how experts reply to posts from
regular users can be useful in obtaining improved results over other features
which do not consider this reply path structure.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this study, we attempt to empirically argue whether the reply network
structure from the darkweb discussions could be leveraged to predict external
enterprise threats. We try to leverage the network and interaction patterns
in the forums to understand the extent to which they can be used as useful
indicators. Our method achieved a best F1 score of 0.53 for one type of attacks
against class imbalanced attack data using Logistic Regression models while
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being able to maintain high recall. Using an unsupervised anomaly detector,
we are able to achieve a maximum AUC of 0.69 by the leveraging the net-
work structure. The main premise of this work is based on using two different
datasets to correlate attacks and user interactions - the limitations clearly lie
in being precisely able to infer the path to the attack through discussions.
This would require some additional mechanisms on leveraging the content to
check whether the discussions catered to a particular exploit that caused the
attack. But we believe that our framework caters to the general understand-
ing of how user interaction patterns can be mined using attributes related to
vulnerabilities and how they can be leveraged to create a framework for attack
prediction.
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Appendix
The outline for the algorithm for creating the social graph G has been de-
scribed in Algorithm 2.
